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Abstract In this paper I will offer a novel understanding of a priori knowledge. My
claim is that the sharp distinction that is usually made between a priori and a
posteriori knowledge is groundless. It will be argued that a plausible understanding
of a priori and a posteriori knowledge has to acknowledge that they are in a constant
bootstrapping relationship. It is also crucial that we distinguish between a priori
propositions that hold in the actual world and merely possible, non-actual a priori
propositions, as we will see when considering cases like Euclidean geometry.
Furthermore, contrary to what Kripke seems to suggest, a priori knowledge is
intimately connected with metaphysical modality, indeed, grounded in it. The task of
a priori reasoning, according to this account, is to delimit the space of
metaphysically possible worlds in order for us to be able to determine what is actual.
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1 Introduction
Characterisations of the a priori usually start with the idea that a proposition is
knowable a priori if it is knowable independently of experience. But to what degree
can anything be known independently of experience? What is the relationship
between established a posteriori knowledge and a priori knowledge? And further, are
there any synthetic a priori truths, or, more neutrally, non-analytic a priori truths? I
suppose that the most popular view today is that all a priori truths are analytic and
that a priori reasoning is some sort of conceptual analysis. However, the alternative
view, namely that some and indeed the most interesting kind of a priori truths are not
analytic, is not unheard of. It does certainly seem that if there are non-analytic a
priori truths, they are the most interesting sort. Here, I am interested in the a priori
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exactly in this sense. I will suggest that the (non-analytic) a priori, rather than strictly
independent of experience, is always one step beyond experience. To be able to
reach this step, we must have an a posteriori framework to take us just below that
next step. Furthermore, once the a priori step has been firmly verified, by a posteriori
methods, it becomes a part of the established a posteriori framework. What I mean is
that the a priori is in a constant bootstrapping relationship with the a posteriori.
Despite this intimate connection with the a posteriori, a priori reasoning is a distinct,
crucial method of inquiry which is not reducible to the empirical. In Section 2, I will
examine the connection between the a posteriori and the a priori and defend the view
that they are in a bootstrapping relationship.
Apart from the analytic/synthetic distinction, it needs to be settled where the a priori
stands in terms of the necessary/contingent distinction. I will argue that the defining
characteristic of the a priori is in fact its relationship with modality. To start with, we
must acknowledge Kripke’s critique: ‘a priori’ is not synonymous with ‘necessary’,
and not all necessary truths are a priori. Given Kripke’s compelling examples, there
should be very little controversy over this matter. Nevertheless, I certainly wish to
maintain the link between the a priori and modality; the qualification that is needed
concerns the strength of this connection, namely, apriority only implies possibility. In
what follows, it will be shown that it is precisely the connection with modality that
helps us to answer some of the hardest questions about the a priori. For example, the
question about the status of the a priori in regard to the analytic/synthetic distinction
then reduces into a question about the nature of the involved modality. If the modality
in question is conceptual, it would appear that there is little room for non-analytic a
priori truths, but if a priori knowledge concerns metaphysical modality, it seems clear
that there have to be (something like) synthetic a priori truths. I will argue that the latter
is true, although I do not find the analytic/synthetic distinction very informative in the
first place. The relationship between the a priori and modality is the concern of
Section 3. Finally, I will combine the two points introduced above – the
bootstrapping relationship between a posteriori and a priori knowledge and the
connection between the a priori and metaphysical modality – and demonstrate that
the upshot of these views is a coherent and plausible characterisation of the a priori.
Before I will advance to defend my claims in detail, it will be necessary to make
some clarifications. Firstly, the positive characterisation of ‘a priori knowledge’
suggested here states that a logically valid a priori proposition1 always holds in at
least one possible world. It is a separate issue whether it holds in the actual world,
and this generally has to be determined by a posteriori means (given that we are
dealing with non-analytic a priori truths). The question that remains is how do we
define ‘a priori knowledge’; do any logically valid a priori propositions qualify, or
only the ones that are true in the actual world? For the time being, let us assume the
latter—we will return to the matter later.
Secondly, I hold that a priori reasoning is fallible, but also that a priori knowledge,
understood as above, is fallible. By ‘a priori reasoning’ I mean the rational activity
1 An ‘a priori proposition’ being any proposition that was reached by a priori means. The validity of the
proposition simply means that the reasoning process that led to it is consistent and does not violate the
laws of logic, i.e. that human error is ruled out and we have no reasons to suspect its feasibility.
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that human beings engage in when trying to reach a priori knowledge. The Cartesian
conception of the a priori maintains a strong link between apriority and necessity,
which naturally implies that consistent a priori reasoning provides access to
necessary truths. Presumably, this still leaves space for the fallibility of a priori
reasoning, but not for the fallibility of a priori knowledge. Kripke’s ideas on the
matter are usually considered to have severed the link between apriority and
modality completely, but these results do not imply that there is no connection
between the a priori and modality, they only imply that a priori reasoning is not a
direct guide to necessity. There might be a temptation for a deflationary account of
the a priori given the usual interpretation of Kripke’s results, but we can certainly put
forward a more explanatory view if these results are understood correctly.2 We have
a middle way between abandoning the a priori altogether (cf. Quine 1951, but also
MacBride3) and giving a characterisation of it which does not grasp the traditional
sense at all. However, I cannot sympathise with the recent accounts on the nature of
the a priori,4 for although they do make some important amendments, they tend to
fall guilty of the same fault that the classic debate between rationalism and
empiricism did, i.e. the illusion that a priori and a posteriori knowledge are wholly
separable.
Many modern accounts of the a priori, such as Laurence BonJour’s (1998), do
correctly acknowledge that a priori reasoning is fallible. There are three things to
note here.
1. Human beings are fallible creatures and their rational capabilities are subject to
errors.
2. Even when a valid a priori proposition is reached, it might not hold in the actual
world.
3. The status of a priori propositions in the actual world is generally determined by
a posteriori means, which are, of course, fallible.
The first two points concern the fallibility of a priori reasoning – how it might fail
to produce a priori knowledge – whereas the third one suggests, given that a priori
knowledge is considered to require the truth of a valid a priori proposition in the
actual world, that a priori knowledge as well is fallible. This is a direct consequence
of the fallibility of our (empirical) means to verify the truth of any given a priori
proposition in the actual world. Accordingly, a priori reasoning can never reach
absolute certainty.5
What about the supposed empirical indefeasibility of a priori propositions (cf.
Field 2000)? Well, in the terms that I have been using, an a priori proposition that is
true in the actual world, that is, a logically valid and consistent a priori proposition
that counts as a priori knowledge, could still be subject to falsification later. Now, it
2 Friedman’s (2000) account, for instance, is a good attempt at this.
3 MacBride, F., ‘Ontological Categories: A priori or A posteriori?’, delivered at the Conference On
Methodological Issues In Contemporary Metaphysics, 6–7 January 2006, Nottingham.
4 Cf. BonJour (1998), Peacocke (2000, 2004), Bealer (2000), Field (2000); I will not analyse these
accounts in detail, but it will become apparent where my views differ from most recent suggestions.
5 For the time being, I will leave the case of necessary (non-analytic) a priori truths aside, but they will be
discussed briefly later on. However, analytic a priori propositions are not my concern here.
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must be noted here that, given a fallibilistic picture to start with, ‘truth’ is not an
absolute notion: the truth of an a priori proposition – unless it is necessary, in which
case we will deal with it later – will always be verified by empirical means.
Obviously, we might have gotten the empirical story wrong and if this is the case
then it would seem that the proposition is not, and never was, true in the actual
world. It will still be true in the actual world that the proposition is true in some
possible world, just not in this one, but this is another matter. So, it seems that, due
to the fallible nature of empirical information itself, there is always a possibility that
further empirical information might falsify a priori propositions that were previously
believed to be true. This implies that if we insist that ‘a priori knowledge’ refers to
those a priori propositions which are true in the actual world, then a priori
knowledge is indeed fallible. I must say that this result does not please me. This is
why I will suggest a different definition for ‘a priori knowledge’. This definition
must be very broad, because otherwise we could never determine when we have
reached a priori knowledge. Thus, my suggestion is that any logically valid and
consistent a priori proposition constitutes ‘a priori knowledge’, whether or not it is
true in the actual world. When defined like this, a priori knowledge, albeit a very
broad notion, is empirically indefeasible and we can avoid the problematic cases
where the status of an a priori proposition in the actual world seems to change.
So, a crucial feature of my characterisation of the a priori is the distinction
between a priori propositions that hold in the actual world and a priori propositions
that grasp merely a non-actual possibility. This distinction is of utmost importance if
a plausible characterisation of a priori knowledge is to be established. Without it, we
would have no means to deal with cases where an a priori proposition that was
believed to be actual is later falsified by further empirical information. The problem
is that if we define apriority simply in terms of the actual world, then either the
original proposition has lost its a priori status or it was not a priori to start with.
Perhaps the best known example of this is the case of Euclidean geometry, which,
according to Kant, is a priori and necessary. Empirical results in favour of the
general theory of relativity seem to have falsified Euclidean geometry, but it surely
cannot be that the a priori status of Euclidean geometry has changed. Either it was
always a piece of a priori knowledge and still is or it never was. The consensus
seems to be that it was not a priori in the first place, or, at least, Euclid’s
controversial fifth postulate6 is and never was a priori. The problem that we are
faced with, however, is that possibly empirical information that falsifies any of
Euclid’s first four postulates could emerge as well, and again we would have to say
that they were not a priori to start with.7 This causes two serious complications: a
priori knowledge appears to be empirically defeasible, and it seems that we can never
know for certain whether we have a genuine piece of a priori knowledge at hand.
A plausible way to deal with these problems is to adopt the distinction between a
priori propositions that hold in the actual world and merely possible a priori
6 The fifth postulate states that if two lines intersect a third so that the sum of the interior angles on one
side is less than two right angles, then the two straight lines, if extended indefinitely, must intersect on the
side on which the sum of the angles is less than two right angles.
7 Or, perhaps more plausibly, geometry altogether is not a priori, but the point stands.
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propositions (i.e. the ones that do not hold in the actual world), which I suggested
above. We ought to keep in mind though that, because of the fallible nature of our
verification methods, the status of a priori propositions in regard to the actual world
may be subject to revision in the future. Nevertheless, we can agree that once the
validity of an a priori proposition is established, that is, if the proposition is logically
valid and consistent, its a priori status will never change. So, what happened in the
case of Euclidean geometry is that further empirical information pointed out that it
does not entirely correspond with the actual world. However, this does not change
the a priori status of Euclidean geometry.8 So, if my definition of ‘a priori
knowledge’ is accepted, then Euclidean geometry is still very much in the realm of a
priori knowledge. This is a small price to pay for a coherent conception of a priori
knowledge.
2 The Bootstrapping Relationship Between A Posteriori and A Priori Knowledge
Now that the basis of my account has been established, we can advance to examine
the first claim: a posteriori and a priori knowledge are in a constant bootstrapping
relationship. A dramatic example of this relationship is the gravitational theory. We
have good records of how knowledge about gravitation has cumulated in this
process. Let us start from Aristotle, who reasoned that the speed of falling bodies is
directly proportional to their weight, and thus, heavier bodies should accelerate
faster. This appears to be an a priori proposition, but, as Galileo famously argued,
two falling bodies of different weights that become connected in the middle of their
fall create a paradox in Aristotle’s reasoning. This is an example of the fallibility of a
priori reasoning due to human error, for no doubt Aristotle believed that he was
presenting an a priori proposition. Galileo, however, fared better. Having identified
the faults in Aristotle’s reasoning, Galileo came up with an a priori proposition of his
own, later formulated as a general law for acceleration. Of course, Galileo not only
formulated this a priori proposition, but also tried to determine whether it holds in
the actual world, as it appeared to do.
For Newton, the level of established a posteriori results was Galileo’s theory—a
theory which used to be only an unverified a priori proposition, but was verified by a
posteriori means. Newton tried to reason how these results could explain the
movements of heavenly bodies. His familiar formula states that the gravitational
force is proportional to the product of the point masses involved and inversely
proportional to the square of the distance between the point masses. This a priori
proposition as well seemed to correspond nicely with actuality, as Newton observed
in the case of the Moon and the Earth. So, again we have an a posteriori verification
for an a priori proposition. Of course, Newton’s theory launched numerous attempts
to deduce new a priori results about our solar system, and many were successfully
established. Among them was the predicted existence of Neptune, which was
subsequently found because we knew where to look. However, to get back to the
8 For a more detailed discussion of Euclid’s postulates with at least partly similar sentiments, see BonJour
(1998, Appendix).
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main line of a priori and a posteriori bootstrapping concerning gravitation, we need
to advance to Einstein.
Eventually, it became clear that Newton’s theory is unable to explain all the
movements of the planets. Namely, the orbit of Mercury did not quite seem to follow
Newtonian predictions. A posteriori knowledge thus pointed out the insufficiency of
an a priori proposition—this is an example of the second sort of fallibility
concerning a priori reasoning: Newton’s a priori proposition, although valid, did
not correspond with the actual world. So we needed a better one, and Einstein gave
us general relativity. With the help of general relativity we were able to explain the
orbit of Mercury, among quite a few other things. Empirical experiments concerning
the bending of light (by sun’s gravity) soon corroborated Einstein’s theory and its
superiority over Newton’s theory was obvious. However, we do not need to stop
here, for combining general relativity and quantum mechanics has proved out to be
very problematic. So, the current situation is that yet again we are looking for an a
priori proposition which would explain quantum gravity. There are several
suggestions in the air, such as the string theory, but at present we have no means
to determine whether the a priori propositions of string theory hold in the actual
world or are merely non-actual possibilities.
This is of course a very simplified description of the bootstrapping relationship;
for instance, we are not really talking about individual a priori propositions but,
rather, about a network of them. All that I am trying to establish here is that
knowledge accumulates in a manner of bootstrapping. If you have doubts about
whether the reasoning involved in these scientific examples is really a priori, bare
with me for a while, as I will elaborate on this. In the meanwhile, I will illustrate the
process with another example: a game of chess.
Someone with good knowledge of different openings can play several moves in a
chess game with only his experience of these famous openings as a guide. He can
simply counter every move by the corresponding move in the opening library, which
is based on previous chess games. But when the opponent makes an unexpected
move, or when enough moves have been played and the opening library is of no
help, even the best chess player has to start thinking about his next move. One must
consider different possible move combinations as deep as possible and decide on the
best one, analogously to the case of different possible scientific explanations
concerning gravitation. Of course, a new ‘a posteriori basis’ for these considerations
is established with each played move, and the cycle starts again. So, each chess
move played is an example of the bootstrapping relationship between a posteriori
and a priori knowledge. But do not be mislead by this example. Even though a chess
game mimics the bootstrapping relationship very nicely, it is clearly not a genuine
example—naturally the whole idea of the game must be derived from some
mathematical truths which would perhaps qualify as a priori knowledge, but these
are not the concern of the player.9 Indeed, this is an artificial example and I only use
it to illustrate the phenomenon of bootstrapping. I will return to the example briefly
in the next section.
9 If we did want a genuine chess-related example of a priori reasoning, we should perhaps look at the
invention of chess. However, very little is known of it.
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Perhaps the conception of the a priori suggested here does not seem very
interesting, for it is beginning to look as if almost all reasoning is a priori reasoning.
The upshot of my account is indeed that most scientific and certainly all philosophical
reasoning fall in the scope of the a priori, but there are several reasons why this is
nevertheless a very interesting understanding of the a priori. Some of these reasons
will become apparent in the next section, but we can observe a few already.
Firstly, the manner in which a priori reasoning seems to be tangled with the ever-
changing a posteriori framework is a crucial insight concerning the scientific
method. The process is not simply one of coming up with hypotheses and verifying
them, as if the a posteriori framework was a sturdy staircase and every hypothesis is
a new step on top of the other. The staircase is not immutable: any previous step
might prove out to be rotten. Furthermore, we do not have a single direction that the
next step can take—in fact, there are whole parallel staircases with altogether
different groundings, and our next step could overlap with any of them. This ever-
changing staircase is supposed to illustrate the uncertainty concerning the
verification of our a priori propositions; the history of science is full of examples.
The problem is that we can never know with certainty that the staircase we are
building is the actual one, that is, our a priori propositions might have led us astray
about what is actual. What is interesting is how we might learn to better evaluate
these a priori propositions. This is not necessarily a purely empirical matter, for part
of the question is which combinations of different a priori propositions are
compatible—it is the task of ontology to examine this. But I am already getting
ahead of myself. Before we can discuss these matters in detail, something must be
said of another interesting consequence of this conception of the a priori.
The staircase might still serve as a useful metaphor. What is interesting is the first
step or, even further, the ground below the staircase. If my understanding of the
bootstrapping relationship between a priori and a posteriori knowledge is correct,
there is a pressing question about where does all this start. It would appear that the
staircase can only be grounded in a priori principles, as each step seems to first
require an a priori proposition, which is then checked against experience. Well, there
may be some a priori principles, such as the law of non-contradiction,10 which could
serve as such fundamental principles. If there are principles like this, it would seem
that they must be necessary—a common ground for all possible staircases. If this is
the case, these principles are obviously of utmost importance for us, as they would
tell us something about the necessary constraints of reality, not only about the actual
world. But before we get too enthusiastic, a word of caution is in order. It seems that
we have no reliable method of testing whether we have indeed reached a
fundamental a priori proposition or merely one of the very first steps in our
staircase. Clearly, verifying the principle by empirical means only helps in terms of
the actual world. This also implies that no matter how irrefutable something like the
law of non-contradiction seems, we cannot simply postulate its necessity and infer
that it must hold in the actual world as well—even the law of non-contradiction is
10 Or at least the law of minimal contradiction, i.e. not every statement is both true and false (cf. Putnam
1978).
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subject to verification, or falsification as the case may be. Having said that, I think
that we have a fairly reliable case for the validity of the law of non-contradiction in
the actual world, and to my mind it is also our best candidate for a metaphysically
necessary principle. Consequently, as groundbreaking as necessary a priori truths
would be, it is always quite risky to claim that we have found one.
So, when we engage in a priori reasoning, we take small steps on our staircase
towards what could possibly follow from the already established steps. In
philosophy, these steps tend to be considerably bigger than in other disciplines
(and potentially more erroneous because of that). However, a priori reasoning is
what philosophers are educated to do and they, if anyone, should go for the largest
steps. The question that we are left with is what grounds these different possibilities
that might follow? To answer this and other related questions, we need to examine
my second point: the connection between the a priori and modality.
3 The Modal Basis of A Priori Reasoning
In the examples of the previous section we saw that a priori reasoning appears to be
concerned with possibilities. Consider the chess game again: each of the trillions and
trillions of move combinations represents a different possibility, a different path that
the game could take. It is by considering different possibilities that we try to
determine the path that leads to victory. A chess game, though, is hardly a challenge
for our rational capabilities when compared to a priori reasoning concerning the
reality. It is a closed system with strict rules and no exceptions. Compared to the
number of different possible paths that the reality might take, a chess game seems
very simple. In a chess game, our reasoning relies on the rules of the system; how
else could we determine the possible routes that the game might take. The question
that emerges is: are there analogous ‘rules’ in reality, that is, constraints for the
different possible routes that reality might take?
It would appear that there indeed must be some constraints like this, as otherwise
we would be unable to reach any results whatsoever concerning reality. However,
even if there are some constraints that restrict the possible organisations of the world,
the situation is a lot more complicated than the chess game, not only because the
space of possibilities is so much bigger but also because we do not know, exactly,
what the constraints are. Recall the distinction between actual and non-actual a priori
propositions. I suggested that even if an a priori proposition is logically valid and
consistent it still might not hold in the actual world. This would never happen in a
chess game. If a move in a chess game is valid, it just means that all the rules of the
game have been followed. It might not be a good move, but ontologically its status is
identical with all the other valid moves. In contrast to the chess game, an a priori
proposition about the reality can easily fail to follow all the constraints because we
lack sufficient knowledge about them. The only criterion for the validity of an a
priori proposition is that it is logically valid and consistent, i.e. it does not violate the
laws of logic and any human errors in the reasoning process are ruled out. Also, as
we hope to reach a priori results which are actual and not only possible, the
proposition should also be consistent with established a posteriori results. So, we can
deem an a priori proposition valid if it was reached by reliable methods—by
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logically valid and consistent reasoning.11 If there are no empirical considerations
that contradict the proposition, then it is also potentially actual.
As we saw in the story concerning gravitation, Galileo, Newton, and Einstein all
put forward propositions which were valid in the sense described above. However,
so far, every time it has turned out that the governing conditions of reality are a lot
more complicated than we previously believed, as empirical information that
conflicts the suggested propositions has emerged. Generally, we could say that
science is an attempt to come up with the best approximation that fits these
conditions. Metaphysics, on the other hand, examines these conditions. They consist
of things like relations between different kinds of entities, identity and existence
conditions and other conditions based on the fundamental structure of reality. Of
course, the conditions themselves are examined with the help of a priori reasoning.
For the most part, such as in scientific contexts, they are presupposed, which is to
say that scientists do not contemplate how the conditions work. The identity of
Hesperus and Phosphorus was settled by observing the sky, not by contemplating the
identity conditions between heavenly bodies. Nevertheless, a set of identity
conditions was presupposed.
The role of modality in this process is now starting to emerge. It is the tool that
we use to postulate different scenarios of how the governing conditions of reality
might work. Consider an example that I mentioned before: the discovery of
Neptune.12 The discovery of Neptune is usually credited to Le Verrier, a French
mathematician who predicted its location from calculations concerning the
perturbations in Uranus’ orbit. These calculations were of course based on Newton’s
work on the gravitational force. Quite simply, the perturbations in Uranus’ orbit had
to be caused by a massive body somewhere nearby. From Newton’s formula for the
gravitational force, we get the distance between two massive bodies, Uranus and
Neptune, so we can roughly determine where Neptune must be. Here, it is Newton’s
theory of the gravitational force which is the most important part of the process of
finding Neptune. His theory of gravitation is a scenario about how the governing
conditions of reality might work in regard to massive bodies. It successfully explains
some of the factors that affect the relations between two massive bodies; only some,
because it turned out that the scenario fails in more general contexts, where the
gravitational potential increases. This is where we need to switch to Einstein’s
scenario.
The modal basis of any given scenario about how the governing conditions of
reality might work must be based on the different possible states of affairs that could
explain empirical observations. In our example, Le Verrier took advantage of
Newton’s general theory of how massive bodies interact via gravitation and derived
the most plausible case of what could explain the perturbations in Uranus’ orbit. This
was another massive body, Neptune, situated appropriately. It is important to see that
the idea is not just to identify a priori propositions with contingent scenarios
concerning the possible states of affairs. The possibility of these scenarios is of a
more fundamental sort—just any scenario will not do. According to the account at
11 Possibly also with the help of, say, a computer, as Kripke (1980, 35) has suggested.
12 The example has also been mentioned by Kripke (1980, 79n) and discussed by Hughes (2004, 95–96).
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hand, the modality in question is grounded in the governing conditions of reality. In
this case, the relevant conditions would concern the relations between massive
heavenly bodies: the essences of the entities of this particular kind. This implies that
we are working with metaphysical modality.13 This is why I have stressed that the
modal basis of a priori propositions is so important, for if the modality here would be
epistemic or conceptual, it would reduce a priori propositions into statements which
have no bearing on the actual governing conditions of reality. This cannot be, as a
priori propositions clearly do have a bearing on these conditions.
A possible objection to this picture can be anticipated. One thing that Kripke has
managed to convince most people about is that ‘a priori’ is an epistemic notion and
‘necessity’ is a metaphysical notion. Consequently, the connection between a priori
knowledge and modality has been deemed to fail. Here I have tried to re-establish
that connection in terms of possibility. I also think that Kripke’s case only amounts
to the conclusion that a priori truths are not always necessary or necessary truths a
priori, which I, of course, happily admit. Ultimately, the upshot of my view is that
epistemic and metaphysical issues are fundamentally connected, and it is precisely
modality that upholds this connection. However, my opponent might insist that the
examples concerning scientific hypotheses that we have considered are just that:
examples of scientific hypotheses, not of a priori reasoning. Moreover, a devoted
empiricist could argue that possibility has little to do with all this; scientific
hypotheses are just well-advised guesses, which are then verified or falsified
empirically. There is nothing more to the picture, just guesses and empirical
research.
However, there is more to the empirical story than meets the eye. Consider an
example that I already mentioned in passing: the identity of Hesperus and
Phosphorus. I suggested that their identity was settled by observing the sky, by
empirical means. I also said that a set of identity conditions was presupposed. What I
mean is that it could not have been discovered that Hesperus is Phosphorus if we did
not have some criteria of identity for the sortal ‘planet’. For example, it must have
been known that two planets cannot occupy the same place at the same time. Before
we were able to settle whether Hesperus and Phosphorus are actually identical, we
had to know that it is possible that they are identical.14 Above, I have argued that we
need a priori reasoning to determine what is possible. And why cannot a priori
reasoning be just guesswork? Well, because what is possible is determined by the
identity and existence conditions of the involved entities. The ‘guess’ has to be
based on something, and it can only be based on the natures of the involved entities.
Thus, this is not merely to equate a priori propositions with contingent propositions,
far from it. Otherwise, a priori reasoning would indeed be indistinguishable from
guesswork.
So, before we can settle the actuality of anything, we must already have
determined its metaphysical possibility. Metaphysical possibility, I take it, reduces to
the essences of the entities concerned. The problem with the empiricist’s objection is
13 My sympathies are with Kit Fine’s (1994, see also Lowe 1998) account of metaphysical modality—it is
impossible to go into details here, but as is well known, Fine suggests that we should analyse metaphysical
modality in terms of essences rather than the other way around.
14 See Lowe (1998) for an extensive explanation of why possibility precedes actuality.
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that empirical research is committed to this very picture. Without the a priori
delimitation of what is possible, we could never reach knowledge about what is
actual. A priori reasoning delimits the space of metaphysical possibilities, and only
after the initial delimitation has been done can we proceed to test individual a priori
propositions by empirical means. This cycle emerges repeatedly, as progress from
established empirical results to new information again requires a delimitation of
different metaphysically possible states of affairs which are compatible with the
current results. Here we have a method by which knowledge slowly but surely
accumulates, even though we can never reach absolute certainty.
4 Conclusion
I am now in the position to define the a priori with a single phrase: the a priori
concerns different metaphysically possible configurations of the governing con-
ditions of reality. Already in Section 1 I suggested that we should define a priori
knowledge in the broad sense, that is, all knowledge concerning the different
metaphysically possible configurations of the reality is a priori knowledge, even
though only one of these configurations is actual. However, given the difficulty of
the task of determining which configuration is the actual one, we are better off with a
broad definition of a priori knowledge; otherwise, we have very little use for the
notion. A priori knowledge in this sense is accessible to all rational human beings,
and, as demonstrated in Section 2, it is in a constant bootstrapping relationship with
a posteriori knowledge. The aim of metaphysics (and science, I might add) is to
establish the actual governing conditions of reality, but this process is fundamentally
fallible. Nevertheless, we have good means to falsify a priori propositions which do
not hold in the actual world, so we can at least narrow the space of metaphysical
possibilities, thus slowly but surely gaining more knowledge about what might be
actual, even if the space of metaphysical possibilities does approach infinity.
The exact route from a priori reasoning to knowledge about possible configurations
of the governing conditions of reality has not been extensively examined here. It has
been shown that metaphysical modality plays an important part in this and it could be
said that a priori reasoning just refers to our ability to grasp these metaphysically
possible states of affairs, which I take to be grounded in essences. Given this
understanding of metaphysical modality, the process is relatively straight-forward: the
relations and identity and existence conditions concerning the objects of our inquiry
impose constraints to the possible configurations that the reality may take, and the
space of possibilities consisting of these configurations is accessible to our a priori
capabilities. Modality, then, is what upholds the connection between a priori reasoning
and the structure of reality.
The upshot of this characterisation of the a priori is that we can, after all, salvage
something of the classic understanding of a priori knowledge. Knowledge acquired
with the help of a priori reasoning might not be necessarily true, but it never fails to
be possible, insofar as human error is excluded. There may be nothing particularly
glorious about a priori knowledge, indeed, as I have argued, much of scientific
reasoning falls within its scope, but there is no doubt about its value for philosophy
and science, as it is the basis of the scientific method and all philosophical reasoning.
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